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PROBABLE JAPANESE TERMS OF PEACE,

BY ADACHI KINNOSUKÉ.

"China cedes to Japan, in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the following territories, together with the fortifications thereon:

"(a) The southern portion of the province of Fengtien within the following boundaries: The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River Anping; from thence the line runs to Fenhuang; from thence to Hai-cheng; from thence to Yinkau, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Yinkau, it follows the course of that stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation. This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fengtien, situated in the eastern portion of the bay of Liaotong and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

"(b) The Island of Formosa, together with all the islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

"(c) The Pescadores group—that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of the longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude."

So reads Article II of the Shimonoseki treaty. It is an old, oft-told tale how, without reason, with little humor, and all because of a polite joint note from Russia, Germany and France, this Article was revised. As for Nippon, she showed her vast appreciation for the wisdom of the weak which is called "expediency"; that was the most remarkable phase of this historic incident. And the diplomatists of civilized Europe, with the excellent Count Cassini at the head of them, knew better than any one else that it was not right. And they laughed, because something about this affair seemed to appeal to their sense of humor and made them good-natured. And it does not seem to require the eternal years of God—which schoolboys have been delighted to claim for the cause of truth crushed to earth—to make right

that which the wisdom of the diplomatists and the guns of the combined fleet of the triple alliance made wrong ten years ago. For the reassertion of the original Shimonoseki treaty would be, perhaps, the first item in the peace terms.

Nippon would be happy in receiving the remnant of the once proud Pacific squadron of Russia—those war-ships which are now dismantled in neutral ports, and a few that are sealed up in the ice of Vladivostok. And, with the assurances of profound respect, Nippon would avail herself of this opportunity to beg His White Majesty, the Tsar of All the Russias, not to send any more vessels to the Pacific; His Majesty might find better employment for his good ships on waters nearer his home. As a matter of history, these waters of ours are dear to us. It might be said of them: "The same junk sails are pearling in the light of the setting sun, the same picturesque high sterns with which the poets of the Ashikaga period were familiar, the eternal sky above and the waves below are heaving to the tunes and emotions of a thousand years ago." With the cross of St. Andrew lording it over them, however, these seas become veritable nightmares to the very life of Nippon.

Then there is an old score—it is worse than a woman with a past, this affair of the diplomatic relations between Nippon and Russia. As far back as the memory of the Matsumae clan dates, Saghalin and a greater part of the island of Yezo had been under the rule of the daimyo of the clan. In 1780, the Yedo Government sent out two men, Mogami and Kondo, to make a tour of inspection through the islands of Iturup, Urup, Kunashir, and so on. Five years later, ten men were sent out to Saghalin. When the nineteenth century was scarce four years old there appeared in the harbor of Nagasaki a Russian commission; it was headed by Lezanoff. After the manner of all civilized states seeking an introduction to a new land which had never invited them to come to it, the Russians came to us on a benevolent mission. With them they brought a number of shipwrecked men, natives of Nippon. They were not thoughtless or absent-minded; their charitable enthusiasm did not make them forget to present to the Shogun a petition for trade. The Yedo Government, which knew nothing virtuous in the civilized race—schooled as it had been in the bitter days of Romish ambitions in the earlier days of Christian missions in Nippon—declined the invitation to enter into trade relation-

ship with Russia. The charitable Russian mission turned north and changed its mind, as so often happens with a good man and a good mission; it ravaged the islands of Saghalin and Iturup. About a month after the historic visit of Commodore Perry to Uraga—on the 17th of July, 1853, to be exact—there entered the harbor of Nagasaki a Russian admiral, Putiatin by name. In presenting the letter from Nicholas I, he asked for two things: namely, for a solution of the mooted question of the northern boundary between Nippon and Asiatic Russia, and for the trade of Nippon. Six years later, when the Crimean war was over, in 1859, the famous Count Muravieff entered Yedo Bay in a man-of-war; his dealings with the Chinese officials had made him famous for modesty: he demanded the recognition by Nippon of the whole of Saghalin Island as Russian territory. The Tokugawa shogunate, tottering on its maimed legs, as it was, gave the famous Count of the Amur to understand that there is a certain difference in temperament between the mandarin and the samurai. He succeeded in carrying away with him nothing better than his bad temper. After many a tortuous turn of negotiation, on the 7th of May of our own, and on the 25th of April of the Russian, calendar, 1875, the Gortchakoff-Enomoto treaty was at last signed. The whole of Saghalin Island passed into the hands of Russia; and, in return, Russia agreed to recognize several of the islands of the Kurile group as the territory of Nippon. That the early knowledge that the Nippon Government had as to the resources and value of Saghalin (of which one can still read in the memorials of so able a statesman as Kuroda) made for the satisfaction of an unholy territorial hunger of Russia is beyond all question. Nevertheless. . . . For many a year it has been no secret with us, the people of Nippon, that there is one wish somewhat dearer to the heart of His Majesty the Emperor than others. On the day when he received the dais from his imperial father, the Empire of Nippon contained the island of Saghalin: on the day when he will vacate the dais in favor of his heir, he would see on the map of Nippon at least every inch of the soil which had known the gracious rule of his august father. And, to-day, a wish of His Majesty—I do not care how slight or remote it be—is nothing short of a passion with the people of Nippon. To the eyes of the West, our devotion to our ruler is past all understanding; it may be well to say here that it passes our own understand-

ing as well. The present war has served, however, to bring home to the minds of our Western friends the existence of this miraculous devotion, which cannot be questioned. Now, the imperial dream of handing down his line the Empire intact is neither slight nor remote. It would be very singular, therefore, if the diplomatists of Nippon should agree on a settlement of this war without the retrocession of Saghalin.

As for the disposition of Manchuria, Nippon has not wrapped her intentions in foggy rhetoric for the puzzle-shelf of diplomacy; she has ever been glad to share them with all the world, and why not? Manchuria is a rich province; the most remarkable thing about it is its future, the promises which its resources hold out to modern enterprise. Nippon did not wish that a party should come along—a party, especially, which has never had any pertinent business there—and build round about its fertile plains a wall much more difficult to break through than the famous walls of ancient China. “Open door” is already a classic phrase with America, England and Nippon. Through the weary months that have fertilized its plains with her blood, Nippon’s wishes have never been altered. She wishes Russia to evacuate Manchuria; she has not the slightest desire of remaining in it herself. In making a present of Manchuria to China, Nippon in all fairness might be permitted to ask China to furnish her a joint guarantee from three Powers—namely, America, Great Britain and Nippon herself—that the territory thus turned over to its rightful owner, China, shall not be leased or ceded to a foreign Power: that is one requirement. And the other boon she would be likely to ask is this: That, in consideration of the return of the province wherein is the imperial mausoleum of the reigning house of China, the Chinese Empire would consent to open a number of her provinces, ports and towns to the commerce of all the world. This, of course, is important, commercially, to the interest of Nippon. The chief end in view, however, is to waken our neighbor to her national consciousness.

The world seems to have forgotten that the East-China Railway is a property owned by a private company. Certainly, the Government of the Tsar has not given the road and the curious public many opportunities to see that the railway is the property of a private company; the wolf has not, in spite of its reputed cunning, taken much advantage of the lamb’s skin. And in the

end, and at the time of the reckoning of things in their real status, it will matter but little. If it please the cleverness of the Russian diplomatists to insist that the East-China Railway is the property of a private company, Nippon is not likely to dispute that claim. And Nippon would be happy in paying her respectful attention to the terms of a few articles of the Hague Convention, beginning with the fifty-third, which have something to say about the military occupation of railways that are not of government ownership. One thing is certain, however, that, after all this, Nippon would simply demand that the Government of the Tsar should pay the private company which owns the railway, and turn the East-China branch of the trans-Asian road—that is to say, from Harbin to Port Arthur and Dalny—into the hands of Nippon. Writing as early as June of last year, Dr. Tomizu, one of the highest authorities on law, both domestic and international, also on world-politics, in Nippon, concludes: “At any rate, it is imperative that the Nippon Government should receive into its hands the East-China Railway.”

The same authority advocates the cession by Russia to Nippon of the Siberian territory east of Lake Baikal. Now, the entire Russian territory east of Baikal is neither the most modest demand in the world, nor is it well defined. Nippon's actual demand will be more likely to define it as the territory east of the River Amur—the line of demarcation to be drawn from the mouth of the river to Nicholaievsk, and then to follow the course of the river to the Manchurian boundary. This, of course, would include the fortifications and naval base at Vladivostok. The reason for this demand is simple: it is the very same reason for which Nippon took up arms—the permanent peace of the Far East and the future security of the national existence of Nippon. Let the critics who would frown upon this demand as extravagant remember that the war, now that it has come, is with us no flowering of a dream or a gilt toy of glory. Simply, it is a sad operation; a surgeon's knife which fights the cancer, with the patient's life as its stake, would be more than profitless, would be criminal, were it to hesitate to cut out the last vestige of the root of the fatal foe. As it was to American patriots many years ago, the only lamp unto the feet of them who would shape the future of Nippon is history. And the tales of Russia's ambitions, of her appetite for territory, and her absent-mindedness over solemn

treaties in black and white, which the past has to tell are lost in no cloudy rhetoric. Russia is great: it is her potential strength that the Nippon framers of the peace treaty must first of all take into consideration. Nippon has no desire for a future war with Russia—or with any other country. There is only one way open to her—to make herself on the North Pacific stronger than Russia will be after she shall have recovered from the effects of this war, after she shall have been born again, after she shall have come to her own national consciousness.

“The meaning of the conclusion of a peace treaty must needs be the same as the establishment of definite and effective measures to prevent a future war which might arise without them,” wrote the “Nippon,” one of the three conservative dailies of Tokio, in its editorial column of the issue of the twenty-fourth of January of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji. It went on to comment:

“If you were to allow your imagination to roam over the possible battle-fields of a future war between Russia and Nippon, it would necessarily travel both on land and over seas; it would not be a simple trip. As for the naval aspect of it, however, it is comparatively simple. At this day, and henceforth, Port Arthur being already in our hands, there is only one thing necessary—to place Vladivostok at our command. That is the only naval base for the homing of the Russian squadron so far away from home. It would be practically impossible to establish any other naval base of importance on the Pacific in the future; and the reason of it all is simple: there is not another point on all the Russian littoral on the Pacific that would serve well the Russian ambitions and dreams of the command of the sea. If we succeed in attaining one of the two ends in view—namely, either to annex the port of Vladivostok or force Russia to agree to make it a non-naval port—Russia shall have lost the last naval base in the Far-Eastern waters. . . . The order of the day is the occupation of Vladivostok. For this reason, we say that the time for our country to devote her attention to peace propositions must of necessity be after the occupation of Vladivostok.”

To cope with Russia, when Russia is a unit, alive and wide awake to every phase of her strength, that, certainly, is no dwarf's programme. For Nippon, as she stands to-day, to dream of such a thing is simply to make herself ridiculous with a madman's delusion. It is always safer to count upon your own strength than to depend on the sense of justice, humanity and responsibility of your allies. With a Power, however, that is unquestioned mistress of the North Pacific, and whose flag covers practically the

entire stretch of coast-line from the mouth of the Liao River to Nikolaievsk, with sufficient hinterland to make her sovereignty solid, matters will be different. Then Nippon might be able to sleep upon a high pillow. Now that the unhappy war is on, every one in the Land of the Gods is praying the eight million gods of his fathers that this shall be the last of the dark *jigoku* upon earth. At the end of our diplomatic defeat ten years ago, which crowned our victorious land with a crown of thorns, we nevertheless were happy enough to receive a precious lesson. And now the people of Nippon are prepared to do either one of these two things: to die in this present struggle, under a cloudless sky, a death honored and brave, such as would have been dear to the hearts of the samurai of old; or to live in such a manner that the very idea of aggression upon their rights would be ridiculous even in the eyes of the civilized West.

The Russian cession of the Amur district is important from a military and strategic standpoint. There is something more important even than that; it helps to solve a question which might be considered rather vital. The cession of the Saghalin Island and the Amur district would place in the hands of Nippon the fisheries of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Gulf of Tatar, as well as that of the northern portion of the Sea of Nippon. At present, the fishing interest of Nippon in the waters round about Saghalin amounts to a good deal over three million yen a year. With Saghalin and the Amur littoral in our hands, and with a careful administration of the fishing industry, the business would amount to over twenty million yen a year. And the fishing possibilities in the Sea of Okhotsk are far more important than in the waters about Saghalin. Another thing: Since the adoption of the gold standard in our country, Korea has been furnishing us gold to the value of from three to five million yen every year. A very little gold is produced in Nippon. The gold-mining in Korea and the Amur districts would do much to place our monetary system on a firmer basis.

Indemnity? It is far too early to speak of that. That certainly depends solely on the duration of the war.

ADACHI KINNOSUKE.